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Abstract
On August 1st, 2017, the day Bitcoin Cash
(BCH) forked, the number of reachable nodes
on the bitcoin Peer-to-Peer network increased
from 11,0000 to over 16,000. 12 hours later, the
number of reachable nodes returned to 11,500.
The 5,000 additional connections were caused by
sybil peers running on Amazon’s cloud services.
The peers announced version strings Bitcoin
ABC:0.14.x and BUCash:1.1.0 and advertised
new BCH blocks.
1 Analysis
We run two monitor nodes that connect to all
reachable peers on the bitcoin Peer-to-Peer net-
work1. The nodes remain passive and only log
the timestamp they received INV messages ad-
vertising blocks or transactions from other peers.
Figure 1 shows the number of connections
from our monitor nodes. The number of sybil
connections is simply the difference between the
total number of connections and the number of
unique IP addresses we are connected to. On
1https://dsn.tm.kit.edu/bitcoin
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Figure 1: Number of connections.
August 1st, 2017, the number of sybil peers in-
creased to up to 5,000 for a period of about 12
hours.
Figure 2 shows the change in the number
of peers announcing a certain version string
during the considered period. Most sybil
peers announced the version string Bitcoin
ABC:0.14.6(EB8.0), however, some peers also
announced BUCash:1.1.0(EB12; AD12) and
Bitcoin ABC:0.14.5(EB8.0). The number of
peers announcing Bitcoin ABC:0.14.6(EB8.0)
was below 100 before, and at around 400 after
the sybil period.
Figure 3 shows the change in the number
of peers with IP addresses from certain Au-
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Figure 2: Announced Version Strings, only BCH
clients shown.
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Figure 3: Connections per AS, only AS with
most connections shown.
tonomous Systems (AS). We see a steep incline
in the number of peers from the AS from Amazon
(AMAZON-02 and AMAZON-AES) during the consid-
ered period.
Figure 4 shows how many INV messages an-
nouncing each BCH block our monitor node re-
ceived. The blocks on August 1st were an-
nounced by roughly 3,500 peers, the blocks on
August 2nd were announced by roughly 800
peers. No BCH block was mined during a
13 hour period on August 2nd.
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Figure 4: Number of INV messages received for
BCH blocks.
2 Discussion
We can only speculate about the motivation for
spending the money to run several thousand
client instances on cloud services. Possibilities
are:
• The newly forked Bitcoin Cash system
should be supported by providing more
peers that relay blocks and transactions
that other peers can connect to.
• The sybil peers could be part of an eclipse
attack in which honest peers connect solely
to the sybil peers and get cut off from the
rest of the network. A possible attacker
might be able to exploit the faster diffi-
culty adaption in BCH. Although there were
claims that the sybil peers were misbehav-
ing2 , the sybil peers announced BCH blocks
to our monitor node. We could not see any
misbehavior, however, we do not receive and
analyze blocks and transactions.
• Someone misconfigured his Amazon in-
stances.
2https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/6qvofq/
someone_just_launched_over_500_bucash_nodes_on_
aws/
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